We now know that Joel Klein was appointed CEO of the public school system to institute a city-wide cleansing of New York City's public schools, and create data that "fit" with the strategic plan of Mayor Mike Bloomberg to have total control over $16 billion+.
Along with the no-bid contracts, revision of IEPs without parental knowledge or consent, changing of city-wide tests to dumbed-down versions, "revised new-new" math to make all the data look good, and fudging of graduation rates, test scores,etc., Joel Klein also mandated that Principals promote students not prepared for a higher grade or current grade completion - students who survived superintendent suspensions, corporal punishment, verbal abuse and failing grades - with something called "
credit recovery". Cute.
While members of the Panel For Educational Policy believe that they can pretend that they are doing a public service, the public is on to the sham. Social promotion has taken a new name:
credit recovery.
Posted By David Bloomfield, (pictured at right),June 10, 2009 @ 10:17 am
LINKBy failing to set standards or even track the use of credit recovery in New York City schools, Chancellor Joel Klein has provided a convenient back door for students to pass courses and graduate without subject mastery. The State Education Department has now capitulated to this agenda by promulgating a draft policy [1] based on unpublicized negotiations with the city Department of Education. If implemented, the policy would do nothing to stem this tide of empty credits but, rather, encourage credit recovery by officially recognizing and regularizing it but with inadequate controls and monitoring.
What is
credit recovery? The term is sometimes used technically to denote a formal program, such as summer school, with specified content, attendance, and assessment requirements. But the term is widely applied to any effort to help students pass courses that they would otherwise fail because of incomplete or below-standard work. These students substitute the extra work for regular assessments by writing a paper, taking a test, or providing some other evidence of proficiency in a narrow course topic.
Under the new state policy, schools would need only create a committee (which would not include the student’s teacher) to approve a student’s customized credit recovery plan for a course. The same committee would then review evidence of student proficiency once the plan was completed. The State does not require minimum class attendance or proof that the plan addresses all subject matter deficiencies. If a teacher says a book report suffices to show proficiency, the committee would not need to inquire beyond the teacher’s word. No record of how many courses a student passed using CR would be maintained. There would be no monitoring of assignments’ rigor or the frequency of CR’s use by teachers, schools, or the system as a whole.
What is the problem, though, with giving students a second chance at passing or completing a course by filling in the gaps? First, without standards, there is no way to determine whether credit recovery assignments actually fill those gaps. Second, a course is more than the sum of its parts. For example, a student might fail a test in one unit of geometry and possibly another but if he or she understands other basic geometric concepts, they will likely pass the course. Course failure demonstrates significant overall deficits in factual and conceptual knowledge that a single assignment or mini-course can not erase. But passing the course will mean a lot to the student’s, the teacher’s, and the school’s appearance of success.
Helping students over the hump through credit recovery is not limited to New York City. Nationally, education publishers including Plato and Pearson sell credit recovery kits. But the DOE’s emphasis on data-based accountability, particularly high school credit accumulation and graduation, seems to have resulted in an explosion of credit recovery in New York. Schools are under tremendous pressure, through school report cards’ A-F rating, to produce progress in these metrics.
Credit recovery is a direct route to helping students and schools achieve the 10 credits each year that serve as the DOE’s benchmark of success. Then, with passing grades and a little luck on the Regents — often obtained through narrow and repeated test preparation — students are on pace to graduate. For hundreds of school principals, looking over their shoulders to stay ahead of the peer group against which they are measured, this is a matter of professional life and death. If one principal looks the other way on credit recovery in their schools, others are penalized for more rigorous standards. This race to the bottom will now be officially sanctioned by the State, urged on by Chancellor Klein.
If we do not reject this new policy proposal, more children will seem to be succeeding in high school and more will seem to be graduating with college- and job-readiness. But this will be a mirage. We will be gaming the system for students and administrators alike. We will be saluting proxies rather than real academic achievement.
The Board of Regents needs to put an end to this charade by rejecting this mockery and re-establishing high academic expectations for our youth.
David C. Bloomfield heads the Educational Leadership Program at Brooklyn College, CUNY and is an elected parent member of the Citywide Council on High Schools. He is the author of American Public Education Law.Marc Epstein
Not Worth the Paper . . .
New York’s public schools have replaced social promotion with universal promotion.1 June 2009
LINK
New York City Schools Chancellor Joel Klein’s vision of education reform is based on his idea of the “business model” of accountability and results—which sounds good in principle. Producing numbers that show bottom-line progress is essential to demonstrating Klein’s success. The city’s much-touted improvement in student test scores, though dubious, has convinced many observers that substantial progress is happening. To keep the momentum going and appease the Department of Education’s number crunchers, school administrators strive constantly to improve graduation rates. One of the easiest ways of doing this, unfortunately, is to water down course-credit standards for graduation.
For years now, schools have been switching to “annualization” of their course offerings. Under this structure, students who fail the first semester of a sequential course (say, English 5 and 6) can get credit for both terms if they pass the second semester. The practical effect of this change is to destroy the work ethic of those students who’ve figured out how to game the system. By their junior and senior years, they know that they can blow off the first term and, with some effort in the second, get credit for the full course. For the schools’ part, annualization obviates the need to create costly, inefficient “off-track” spring sections of sequential courses for students who failed the fall section. This helps cut down drastically on night school and summer school, and also sends graduation rates skyward. Under this flawed model, teachers face inexorable pressure to get their numbers up in the second term, however they can.
The education department has taken other questionable steps to boost graduation rates. Consider the fate of summer school. Even as recently as 13 years ago, when I first taught summer classes, the course standards and rules were strictly enforced. Three absences resulted in a student’s automatic termination from the program, and a disciplinary infraction would have the same result. But Harold Levy, Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s last schools chancellor, instituted a kinder and gentler system of asking, if not begging, kids to show up. Teachers were paid to call home and implore parents to send their kids, while a smiling Levy appeared on the evening news, manning the phones himself. Principals would let kids come late, allow them to disappear for two-week vacations in the middle of summer, and drop the issue of passing them into teachers’ laps, asking them to use “discretion.” Then, under Mayor Bloomberg and Chancellor Klein, the old Summer and Evening Division was eliminated altogether in a cost-saving move. A vastly shrunken summer-school operation, run individually by the schools with no outside oversight, retains very little of the old system’s tough standards.
The schools began implementing a program known as “credit recovery,” driven, again, by the pressure on city high school principals to improve their dismal graduation rates. Through credit recovery, a student can receive credit for a failed course after attending at least nine hours of class and completing a total of 25 hours of work. The credit-recovery classes are held during school vacations or in after-school programs. They’re sometimes referred to as “boot camp,” in order to conjure up images of Camp Lejeune in July. State and city directives always call for “rigorous” standards for these programs, but one doesn’t need to be an education policy expert to judge that nine hours in class is a paltry substitute for 16 weeks of class work, or even the 36 hours of summer school in the old system. What amount to extra-credit assignments cannot substitute for course proficiency. Besides, no statewide mechanism for auditing these programs really exists, so it’s left up to the full faith and credit of each school to ensure that they’re reputable. Stories about schools “stuffing” credit-recovery programs to boost graduation figures are legion.
But it gets worse. Until now, students who’ve failed a course must have spent a certain amount of time in that class (known as “seat time”) to be eligible for credit recovery. Last month, however, the State Education Department issued a draft proposal declaring that “seat time” will no longer be a prerequisite. Instead, a school-based committee made up of certified teachers and the principal will set the standards. “The provisions . . . do not require specific seat time requirements for the make-up opportunity since the opportunity must be tailored to the individual student’s need,” the memo declares. This alternative approach renders Chancellor Klein’s own regulations—which call for 90 percent attendance and “successful completion of standards in subject areas”—meaningless.
New York City’s much-heralded end to social promotion in schools has been replaced by something even worse—totally empty, if not universal, promotion. Partly as a result of new policies like credit recovery, this June’s graduation rates will likely reach record highs. Klein’s supporters will once again sound their optimistic refrain about educational progress. But at some point, ordinary New Yorkers, largely excluded from the education debate, will begin to realize that the progress is not what it seems.
Marc Epstein, a teacher at Jamaica High School, served as its dean of students for six years.Under pressure to raise graduation rates, some high schools are turning to online courses to help faltering students revive their academic careers and retrieve the credits they need to earn their diplomas.By Andrew Trotter
As alternatives to remedial lessons, summer school, and other traditional ways of getting struggling high school students back on track, technology-based options for “credit recovery” have been expanding.
“It’s a huge area of growth, especially in the last three years,” says Susan D. Patrick, the president and chief executive officer of the North American Council for Online Learning, a Vienna, Va.-based trade association for online schools.
Most of the new credit-recovery options are online programs offered by virtual schools and commercial curriculum providers. They offer approaches to individualizing instruction that are targeted and packaged for credit recovery, according to the companies and other providers offering the programs.
Credit recovery, or credit retrieval, is usually defined as an in-school opportunity for students to earn academic credits that they have lost, or are about to lose, by failing a regular course.
Michael J. Greene, 18, left, spent the spring in the "Apex lab" run by teacher Kim Feltner, right, at Pine Ridge High School in the Volusia County, Fla., district.
—Gerardo Mora for Education Week
Such options are available from an array of online-curriculum companies, such as Apex Learning Inc. and Plato Learning Inc., as well as nonprofit providers such as the Orlando-based Florida Virtual School and the Atlanta-based Georgia Virtual School.
Providers say they tailor learning to individual students, by using flexible pacing and schedules, extra practice, frequent assessment, and robust monitoring and reporting on participation and progress, while also allowing openings for personal interaction with teachers.
Their learning-management systems tend to have such typical online tools as e-mail, online assessments, and databases. Courses mirror, and are cross-referenced to, states’ academic standards.
Marc Epstein
The Regents, Stuck on Stupid
New York’s statewide exams get a little dumber every year.City Journal 23 July 2008
LINKA year ago, I wrote about the
dumbing down of New York State’s Regents exams, the five tests in core subjects that students must pass to get a regular high school diploma. Since then, little has changed—unless it’s that the
exams have become even dumber. Look no further than this year’s United States History and Government exam for 11th-graders.
The test has three parts and a total of 75 points weighted and calculated to total 100 percent, in a Byzantine formula established in Albany. Fifty multiple-choice questions, along with 15 document-based questions, account for 65 of those points. The student’s raw score is then plotted on a conversion chart provided by the state in combination with the student’s score on two essays, which account for the total score’s remaining ten points. If a student receives as few as 36 points out of 65 in the first two parts of the exam, he can still pass the Regents by earning five out of the ten essay points. According to the point-conversion chart, if he scores 50 points in the first two parts, he doesn’t even have to answer an essay question to pass—because his overall grade is already a 65, the minimum passing grade. If you’re confused by this elaborate scoring system, you’re not alone. But the key point is that students who get fewer than half of the questions correct can pass. And this leniency applies to other Regents tests as well. Students taking the algebra exam, for instance, need only earn a “raw score” of 30—out of a possible 87 points—to pass.
Some might argue that the rigor of the examinations justifies this system of weighting scores. That’s laughable. Consider some of the questions on the history exam. The multiple-choice section features a political cartoon in which a Supreme Court justice points to a chart showing pictures of the three branches of government. The cartoon reads “U.S. Constitution” at the top and “checks and balances” at the bottom. The test question asks: “Which constitutional principle is the focus of the cartoon?” This is all too typical of the half-dozen graphs, maps, and cartoon questions in this section of the test.
The document-based questions account for another 15 points; information garnered from them is then incorporated into one of the essay questions. Students need no prior knowledge of American history to answer the questions successfully. For example, a picture of students outside Little Rock Central High School, where troops guard the schoolhouse doors, bears the caption: “A white student passes through an Arkansas National Guard line as Elizabeth Eckford is turned away on September 4, 1957.” A second photo of Elizabeth Eckford, a black student, reads, “a mob surrounds Elizabeth Eckford outside Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.” The question asks the student to describe what happened to Eckford when she tried to attend Central High School! Another photo depicts the eventual resolution of the Little Rock standoff, when the military enforced desegregation rulings at President Eisenhower’s command. The caption reads: “On September 25, 1957 federal troops escort the Little Rock Nine to their classes at Central High School.” The student is asked, “Based on this photograph, what was the job of the United States Army troops in Little Rock, Arkansas?”
The thematic essay requires students to discuss two people, other than presidents, who played significant roles that led to changes in the nation’s economy, government, or society. In case the students can’t come up with any names, a list is provided: Margaret Sanger, Bill Gates, Henry Ford, César Chávez, Martin Luther King, Jr., Frederick Douglass, Andrew Carnegie, Jacob Riis, and Upton Sinclair. If that’s not enough, the test even provides the nine people’s fields of endeavor.
An examination that neither requires a mastery of a body of knowledge nor demands the proper competence in reading and writing for its grade level measures nothing. However, it does perform a useful, albeit cynical, function: deceiving those who wish to be deceived. While some government officials pursue the content of our foods with a vengeance—restaurants in New York City may no longer use trans fats, and many are also required to display the number of calories in their food—others seem to be busy manipulating the content of our kids’ exams in order to yield pleasing results. All the rhetoric calling for higher standards and improved teacher and student performance turns out to be nothing more than bluster. In the end, there is only one difficult question that the Regents exam poses: What does a student have to do to fail?
Marc Epstein was a contributor to A Consumer’s Guide to High School History Textbooks, edited by Diane Ravitch. He teaches history at Jamaica High School in New York City.Regents math test was quite a challenge
‘Raw score’ of 30 was enough to pass National Standards, Charter Schools and Teacher Recruitment/Dismissal: The Confluence of Policy and PoliticsCredit RecoveryPatronizing the Poor
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After reading the New York Times article on Glenn Storman (see my previous posting, "
Teacher Glenn Storman Wins in Court After Fighting the NYC BOE on False Corporal Punishment Charges"), I realized that this could be a bigger story than what was printed there. It most certainly is. The remand back to the NYC BOE for another hearing was followed by new charges and another federal lawsuit, this time filed not only against the New York City BOE, but PS 212
Principal Josephine Marsella and OSI investigator Dennis Boyles.
The Storman case could change everything in terms of the "Gotcha Squad" and the "rubberization" process, defined as the process in which "The Chancellor's Committee" works with Principals and pretend investigators to destroy people who say anything about them, their school(s), or the harm going on perpetrated by administrators gone wild.
Former
Deputy Chancellors Andres Alonso (pictured at right) and
Marcia Lyles (pictured below) agreed with the "U" as they always do, to support whatever charge is made without witness testimony and/or evidence.
The best way to get an overview of where the case stands right now and the ridiculous antics of the Bloomberg/Klein bunch in the matter of Glenn Storman is to read the
Report and Recommendation of District Court Judge Andrew Peck.
Glenn Storman, is a tenured teacher and Guidance Counselor who has worked for the NYC BOE for 28 years. He was accused of corporal punishment and found guilty by the Principal based upon an allegation of student A, who he reprimanded for cursing at his classroom teacher. Student A told classmates that he would "get" Mr. Storman for waving a rolled up piece of paper near his face and telling him to stop [cursing]. A few days later the father met with Principal Marsella and told her that Mr. Storman had "inserted a piece of paper into Student A's mouth for the purpose of obtaining sexual pleasure". When OSI investigator Dennis Boyles came to the school to "investigate", Student A was not at school that day and was not interviewed. Mr. Storman then
sued the New York City Board of Education in federal court for giving him a "U" rating and accusing him of corporal punishment without proof.
Related story:
The "Gotcha Squad" and the New York City Rubber Rooms
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Congratulations Mr. Storman!
We now know how the NYC Board of Education works to get rid of teachers "they" dont want: write TAC memos which'prove' an allegation (see my articles on the
Teacher Performance Unit and the TPU, and "
Investigating the Investigators")that may or may not be true. What is striking about the case of Mr. Storman is the fact that well-known "Gotcha Squad" OSI-former-police-detective Dennis Boyles is mentioned as changing his mind about what to charge Mr. Storman:
"An investigation by the Department of Education’s Office of Special Investigations ultimately substantiated the charges of corporal punishment. But in an apparent change of heart, the investigator who wrote that report, Dennis Boyles, testified during the appeal process that he did not believe Mr. Storman’s actions rose to the level of corporal punishment, according to the May 11 ruling."See my article about
Workplace Defamation Lawsuits and, if you see Mr. Condon or Mr. Boyles, give them the URL or a copy?
Congratulations also to New York State Supreme Court Judge Shirley Werner Kornreich for seeing that the investigators who accused Mr. Storman of corporal punishment after he waved a rolled up piece of paper in the air as "irrational"(read the entire decision below).
May 28, 2009
Teacher Resists a Charge of Corporal Punishment By JAVIER C. HERNANDEZ, NY TIMES
When
Glenn Storman, a guidance counselor at Public School 212 in Gravesend, Brooklyn, came across an unruly student cursing at a substitute teacher in 2004, he ordered the boy to “zip it” and brandished a rolled-up piece of paper, thinking that would be the last he heard of the encounter.
But five years later, Mr. Storman, 57, is embroiled in a legal dispute over allegations that he committed corporal punishment. A 27-year veteran of the school system, Mr. Storman denies hitting the student and is seeking to erase an unsatisfactory rating that a principal gave him. The Department of Education, however, has defended the rating, arguing that Mr. Storman did indeed touch the student, who was in the fifth grade.
The case shows the difficulties teachers can face in disputing the ratings they receive each year from principals. The ratings can determine whether they are eligible for lucrative teaching opportunities outside of the normal school year. The case also sheds light on the fine lines of interpretation surrounding the question of corporal punishment: Did Mr. Storman’s paper brush against the student? If so, was that intentional, and did it rise to the level of corporal punishment?
Teachers who receive unsatisfactory ratings are allowed to appeal to a court, and this month
a judge in Manhattan ruled in Mr. Storman’s favor, saying she did not find evidence of corporal punishment. The unsatisfactory rating, wrote the judge,
Acting Supreme Court Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich, (pictured at right) “shocks the conscience, was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.”
The Department of Education said last week that it was reviewing the decision and declined to comment further.
In October 2004, Mr. Storman entered a special education classroom at
P.S. 212 after hearing a student yelling. When he stepped into the room, he saw the student on his knees on a chair cursing at the teacher. Holding the piece of paper in his hand, Mr. Storman recalled in an interview, he told the student to be quiet. The student moved forward as he reprimanded him, but Mr. Storman said he did not remember coming into contact with him.
Mr. Storman said he would not have hit the student because he had experience with special education students and did not believe force was the best way of resolving disputes.
“I don’t need to do anything more than to look at them and say, ‘Listen, you know to stop right now,’ ” he said.
Mr. Storman said he had been carrying the rolled-up paper while walking down the hallway. In previous statements to school officials he said he “may have touched” the student’s mouth with the paper, according to the court ruling. He says now that he does not believe that was so.
The boy’s father complained to the school’s principal, who asked for an inquiry, and in 2005, Mr. Storman, who is still a guidance counselor at P.S. 212, received an unsatisfactory rating in his annual review. He appealed, but the Department of Education stood by its determination that he had committed corporal punishment.
Mr. Storman appealed again in 2006, seeking $100,000 in compensation because, he said, the unsatisfactory rating prevented him from getting work as a summer school teacher and a tutor, work which he estimates had added about $25,000 a year to his income. He has also filed a lawsuit in federal court, which is still pending.
Mr. Storman was given another unsatisfactory rating in 2008 after his principal said he had inappropriately yelled at a student, according to Mr. Storman’s lawyer, John. C. Klotz. Mr. Storman is also appealing that rating.
An investigation by the Department of Education’s Office of Special Investigations ultimately substantiated the charges of corporal punishment. But in an apparent change of heart, the investigator who wrote that report, Dennis Boyles, testified during the appeal process that he did not believe Mr. Storman’s actions rose to the level of corporal punishment, according to the May 11 ruling.
Mr. Boyles testified in 2006 that the encounter constituted “inappropriate physical contact” but not corporal punishment, the court ruling said. Last year, Mr. Boyles reiterated his statement that he did not believe Mr. Storman’s actions amounted to corporal punishment, but added that Mr. Storman inappropriately touched the student with the paper, according to the ruling.
The Department of Education defines corporal punishment as “any act of physical force upon a pupil for the purpose of punishing that pupil.”
Mr. Boyles stated in his report that three students in the classroom at the time of the encounter could not recall seeing the paper hit the student’s face. But the fifth grader whom Mr. Storman had reprimanded told the investigator that Mr. Storman had brushed the paper against his lips and embarrassed him, though he added that he had not been physically injured.
The principal of P.S. 212 said at a hearing last year that she had recommended that Mr. Storman be given the unsatisfactory rating because of Mr. Boyles’s findings, which she believed substantiated the corporal punishment charges, according to the ruling.
Justice Kornreich called the Department of Education’s actions “irrational.”
“Nothing in the record supports the D.O.E.’s conclusion that Mr. Storman committed a substantiated act of corporal punishment,” she wrote, ordering that the unsatisfactory rating be annulled.
Mr. Storman said in an interview that the Department of Education had turned a “pebble” into a “mountain worth of wrongdoing.”
“This was a long hard, road,” he said, “and a costly one to me.”
Judge: Brush With Paper Roll Wasn't Corporal Punishment LINKBack in 2005, Glenn Storman, a guidance counselor at P.S. 212 in Gravesend, entered a special education classroom in which a fifth-grader was kneeling on his chair cursing at the teacher. What happened next is a matter of debate: Storman says he happened to be holding a rolled up piece of paper when he told the boy to "zip it." But according to the Times, the student says Storman "brushed the paper against his lips and embarrassed him." After an investigation, Storman got an unsatisfactory rating in his annual review, which is a big deal because it prohibits him from getting extra work as a summer school teacher and a tutor. But after a long legal battle, it looks like the alleged paper punisher will be vindicated: A judge ruled earlier this month that Storman's actions did not constitute corporal punishment, and said the unsatisfactory rating "shocks the conscience, was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion." The Department of Education is reviewing the decision while defending another
lawsuit brought by Storman in federal court. And it's unclear if the student has yet to recover from his brush with rolled up paper.
By John Del Signore in News on May 28, 2009 11:40 AM
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Supreme Court Decides in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen in Favor of Employer and Addresses Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act for First TimeContributor: Littler Mendelson
SUMMARY: On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Souter (with Justice Ginsberg and Justice Breyer dissenting), the Court held that an employer does not necessarily violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) when it pays pension benefits calculated in part based on an accrual rule – in use prior to the PDA's enactment – that gives less retirement credit for pregnancy than for short-term disability leave. The Court held that the employer's method of calculating benefits was insulated from a Title VII challenge because it was part of a bona fide seniority system. The decision is also the first Supreme Court ruling to address the recently enacted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Ledbetter Act), and it limits to a degree the Ledbetter Act's reach in the narrow circumstance where disparities in benefits are based on past, completed actions which were legal when taken.
See
Open CongressWashington D.C. Employment Law Update
Posted at 3:11 PM on May 18, 2009 by Jay Sumner
Supreme Court Issues Decision in AT&T Corp. v. HulteenLINKThe U.S. Supreme Court has held that an employer does not necessarily violate the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) when it pays pension benefits calculated in part under an accrual rule – applied prior to the PDA’s enactment – that gave less retirement credit for pregnancy than for medical leave generally. The Court in
AT&T v. Hulteen (pdf) further held that the benefit calculation rule used by the employer in this case was part of a bona fide seniority system that insulated it from a Title VII challenge.
AT&T Corporation and its affiliates, the petitioner in this case, had calculated an employee’s pension and other benefits based on a seniority system that subtracted uncredited leave time from the employee’s length of service. Employees on disability leave were given full service credit for time off, while those on “personal” leave did not. Prior to 1977, pregnancy leave was considered personal, not disability leave. In 1977, AT&T changed this policy to provide employees who took time off for pregnancy with six weeks of disability benefits and service credit. Any time off taken beyond the allotted six weeks was deemed personal, and no service credit was provided. Following the enactment of the PDA in 1978, which amended
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and made it unlawful to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions, AT&T changed its policy to put pregnancy leave on equal footing with other disability leave for service credit purposes, but did not make service credit calculations retroactive. Therefore, the original plaintiffs in this matter were women who had taken pregnancy leave prior to the policy change, and whose retirement benefits have or would be affected. The plaintiffs’ case was eventually heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which – adhering to precedent – found that applying pre-PDA accrual rules that differentiated on the basis of pregnancy to post-PDA retirement eligibility violated Title VII.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit – which conflicted with holdings by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits – noting that there was no doubt that the payment of the pension benefits in this case was the function of a bona fide seniority system, and that such systems are given a certain degree of immunity from Title VII claims. Specifically, section 703(h) stipulates that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . system . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.. . .” Thus, the Court reasoned, benefit differentials produced by a bona fide seniority-based pension plan are permitted unless they are the results of an intent to discriminate. The Court explained that “[b]ona fide seniority systems allow, among other things, for predictable financial consequences, both for the employer who pays the bill and for the employee who gets the benefit. . . .[a]s § 703(h) demonstrates, Congress recognized the salience of these reliance interests and, where not based upon or resulting from an intention to discriminate, gave them protection.” The Court noted that the company’s seniority system was neither adopted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of sex, nor was it unlawful when adopted.
The respondents, however, argued that the recently-enacted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act – which states, in relevant part, that “an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation . . . when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice” – supports their position that the benefits calculation is discriminatory. The Court disagreed, finding that since the company’s pre-PDA decision not to award the employee service credit for pregnancy leave was not discriminatory, the respondents were not therefore “affected by the application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.”
Justice Souter delivered this opinion, which was decided by a vote of 7-2, with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting.
Supreme Court Decides in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen in Favor of Employer and Addresses Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act for First Time By:Sue M. Douglas, May 2009
On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court announced its decision in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Souter (with Justice Ginsberg and Justice Breyer dissenting), the Court held that an employer does not necessarily violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) when it pays pension benefits calculated in part based on an accrual rule - in use prior to the PDA's enactment - that gives less retirement credit for pregnancy than for short-term disability leave. The Court held that the employer's method of calculating benefits was insulated from a Title VII challenge because it was part of a bona fide seniority system. The decision is also the first Supreme Court ruling to address the recently enacted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Ledbetter Act), and it limits to a degree the Ledbetter Act's reach in
the narrow circumstance where disparities in benefits are based on past, completed actions which were legal when taken.
For additional information regarding the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, see Littler's
Paycheck Rule Revived for
Pay Discrimination Claims with Signing of the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. (See the
full report).
Ledbetter v. Goodyear and the
Ledbetter Act On January 29, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Ledbetter Act, which expressly overturned the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected the "paycheck rule" advanced by the plaintiff - i.e., that each time a paycheck evidencing disparate compensation was issued, a separate act of discrimination arose. The effect of the Court's decision was to limit the timeframe in which employees could bring pay discrimination claims. To maintain a timely claim of pay discrimination under Title VII, the Ledbetter Court held, an employee was required to file his or her claim with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the original discriminatory pay-setting decision, even if the violation continued to affect the employee's compensation long after the 180-day period expired.
In overturning the Supreme Court's decision, the Ledbetter Act has broadened the occurrences that are considered unlawful actions for purposes of triggering a pay discrimination claim.
Under the Ledbetter Act, an unlawful employment practice occurs when: (1) a discriminatory compensation or other practice is adopted; (2) an individual becomes subject to the discriminatory decision or practice; or (3) an individual is affected by application of the discriminatory decision or practice, including each time
discriminatory compensation is paid. With the "paycheck rule" now in effect, employees may seek to reclaim lost compensation long after the initial discrimination took place, so long as the claim is filed with the EEOC within 180 days (or 300 days in some states) of the receipt of any compensation affected by
the initial pay decision. In addition, while the Ledbetter Act does not require employers to repay employees for decades of discriminatory pay differentials, employees can recover back pay up to two years prior to when the employee filed the discrimination claim.
Although combating gender-based pay discrimination was the impetus for the legislation, the Ledbetter Act prohibits pay discrimination based on all of the protected categories under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Rehabilitation Act, i.e., race, color, religion, national origin, age, and disability.
The statutory enactment of the paycheck rule allows employees to challenge pay-related decisions years after they have occurred. As a result, before the decision in AT&T v. Hulteen, it was uncertain whether pay decisions made long ago could be challenged as discriminatory when those decisions were
unquestionably legal under the state of the law at the time they were made.
Hulteen's Claims against AT&T
Prior to 1978, AT&T based its pension calculations on a seniority system that relied on years of service
minus uncredited leave time, giving less retirement credit for pregnancy absences than for medical leave generally. In 1978, Congress passed the PDA which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make it "clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other
medical conditions." The PDA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that differential treatment of pregnancy leave was not sex-based discrimination prohibited by Title VII. With the passage of the PDA, AT&T adopted a new pension plan, which provided the same service credit for pregnancy leave as for other temporary disability leave. AT&T made these changes prospectively, such that no retroactive adjustments were made for the pre-PDA leave calculations.
Because Hulteen took pregnancy leave before AT&T changed its pension plan, she received less service credit for her leave than she would have received had she taken general disability leave. This resulted in a reduction in her total employment term and, consequently, a smaller AT&T pension. Hulteen, along with other affected coworkers and their union, filed EEOC charges alleging discrimination based on sex
and pregnancy in violation of Title VII. The EEOC issued a determination finding reasonable cause to believe AT&T had discriminated and provided Hulteen with a notice of right-to-sue. Hulteen filed suit in federal district court, which, based on Ninth Circuit precedent that was in conflict with Sixth and Seventh Circuit precedent, ruled in favor of Hulteen. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
In response to AT&T's appeal to the Supreme Court, Hulteen argued that, even though AT&T's pre-PDA decision to give less retirement credit for pregnancy absences was legal at the time it was made, AT&T's post-PDA decision at the time of her retirement to calculate her pension on the basis of the credit she had accrued partly under the pre-PDA rules violated the PDA when that decision was made. After oral argument but before the Court issued its opinion, President Obama signed the Ledbetter Act into law. In supplemental briefing, Hulteen argued that the Ledbetter Act further supported her position.
According to Hulteen, whether AT&T's pre-PDA decision was legal when made was irrelevant under the Ledbetter Act. Instead, she argued that the calculation of her pension by AT&T post-PDA was made using a measure of company service that it knew afforded unequal credit for equal service to women who took pregnancy leave prior to 1978. Therefore, Hulteen argued, AT&T's calculation was an "unlawful employment
decision or practice" under the Ledbetter Act, one which affected her each time she received her pension payment.
The Supreme Court's Decision in AT&T v. Hulteen In its decision in Hulteen, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit, holding that an employer does not necessarily violate the PDA when it pays pension benefits calculated in part under an accrual rule that gave less retirement credit for pregnancy than for medical leave generally when that rule was applied only before the enactment of the PDA. In reaching its ruling, the Court noted that seniority
systems are afforded special treatment under Section 703(h) of Title VII, which provides: "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation ... pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system ... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of ... sex." Citing Section 703(h), the Court explained that benefit differentials produced by a bona fide seniority-based pension plan are permitted unless they are the result of an intention to discriminate. The Court reasoned that, because AT&T's system must be viewed as bona fide, i.e., as a system having no discriminatory terms, Section 703(h) governed, and the key
determination was whether AT&T had intended to discriminate when it implemented its pre-PDA accrual rules.
As the Court noted, under Gilbert, the exclusion of disabilities related to pregnancy was not sex-based discrimination within the meaning of Title VII prior to 1978. Thus, AT&T's intent when it adopted the prePDA pregnancy leave rule at issue was to give differential treatment that, as a matter of law under Gilbert, was not gender-based discrimination. In other words, because AT&T's decision to utilize an
accrual rule limiting seniority credit for time taken for pregnancy leave was not discriminatory under Gilbert, it could not be the case that it was intentionally discriminatory. In addition, AT&T had adopted a new pension plan, which provided service credit for pregnancy leave on the same basis as leave taken for other temporary disabilities on the day the PDA took effect.
The Court next held that, even though AT&T could have chosen to give Hulteen post-PDA credit for her pre-PDA pregnancy leave when she retired, its failure to do so was not a discriminatory act. As the Court explained, if a choice to rely on a favorable statute turned every past legal differentiation into contemporary illegal discrimination, Section 703(h) would never apply. Finally, the Court rejected Hulteen's argument that AT&T's calculations were made unlawful under the Ledbetter Act because the payment of her pension benefits were in effect "the application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time ... benefits [are] paid, resulting ... from such a decision." Following its reasoning above, the Court held that AT&T's pre-PDA decision not to award Hulteen service credit for pregnancy leave was not discriminatory at the time it was made, and, therefore, Hulteen had not been "affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice."
What Hulteen Means for Employers Employers should understand that the holding in Hulteen is limited. In Brazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.385 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a pattern or practice that was not illegal prior to Title VII but that would constitute a violation of Title VII did in fact became a violation upon Title VII's effective date. Thus, to the extent an employer continued to engage in that act or practice after the Act's effective date, the employer would be liable under Title VII. In Hulteen, the Court distinguished the facts before it from Brazemore on two grounds. First, the Court noted that Brazemore did not involve a seniority system, indicating that the holding in Hulteen may not extend beyond the context of bona fide seniority systems.
Indeed, at the end of its opinion, the Court emphasized the importance of the predictable financial consequences provided by bona fide seniority systems for both employers and employees.
Second, the Court explained that the employer in Brazemore failed to eliminate the discriminatory practice at issue in that case, even though the newly enacted Title VII had turned what was once legally permissible into something unlawful. In contrast, AT&T had adopted a new pension plan on the effective date of the PDA that complied with the PDA, and therefore AT&T's calculation of Hulteen's pension
payments was based on past, completed events that were not illegally discriminatory when they occurred. Thus, Hulteen appears to limit the reach of the Ledbetter Act only in those circumstances where the allegedly discriminatory compensation at issue is based on past, completed decisions that were lawful when they were made.
Keeping in mind these limitations, the Hulteen decision clearly strengthens the protection afforded under Section 703(h) to bona fide seniority systems, even in light of the enactment of the Ledbetter Act. The Ledbetter Act does not define "discriminatory compensation decision or other practice," leaving this
important phrase subject to varying interpretations. Had the Court agreed with Hulteen's interpretation, employers could have been liable for decisions made years ago relating to their seniority-based compensation systems, even though the decision itself was not illegally discriminatory when made and even though the seniority system was brought into compliance, each time a discrimination law was enacted or amended.
Under Hulteen, however, if a decision regarding the bona fide seniority system at
issue was not illegally discriminatory at the time it was made and the seniority system itself complies with the law going forward, then Section 703(h) applies to protect the seniority system at issue. Thus, although employers must regularly evaluate their seniority systems to determine whether those systems comply with current laws (including newly enacted and amended laws), Hulteen serves to protect bona fide seniority systems that were not adopted for a purpose that was illegally discriminatory.
Conclusion The Hulteen decision curtails liability in those circumstances where employers are faced with claims alleging pay discrimination arising out of compensation decisions involving bona fide seniority systems that were legal when made. The decision is also the first to provide some guidance on the limits of the Ledbetter Act. The holding, however, is very narrow, and how the Supreme Court continues to interpret the Ledbetter Act remains to be seen.
Sue M. Douglas is a Shareholder in Littler Mendelson's Cleveland office. Blake Andrews is an Associate in Littler Mendelson's Atlanta office. If you would like further information, please contact your Littler attorney at 1.888.Littler, info@littler.com, Ms. Douglas at sdouglas@littler.com, or Mr. Andrews at
bandrews@littler.com..jpg)
The Impact of Ledbetter v. Goodyear on the Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws
Testimony of Wade Henderson, President and CEO
Leadership Conference on Civil RightsJune 28, 2007
LINKHouse Judiciary Committee
Categories: Women's Rights
Good Morning. My name is Wade Henderson and I am the President of the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. The Leadership Conference is the nation’s premier civil and human rights coalition, and has coordinated the national legislative campaigns on behalf of every major civil rights law since 1957. The Leadership Conference’s nearly 200 member organizations represent persons of color, women, children, organized labor, individuals with disabilities, older Americans, major religious groups, gays and lesbians and civil liberties and human rights groups. It’s a privilege to represent the civil rights community in addressing the Committee today.
Distinguished members of the Committee, I am here this afternoon to call on Congress to act. To restore the ability of victims of pay discrimination to obtain effective remedies, and to end the inequality of remedies across classes of victims.
Lilly Ledbetter, a supervisor at Goodyear Tire & Rubber in Gadsden, Alabama, sued her employer for paying her less than its male supervisors and a jury found that Goodyear intentionally paid Ms. Ledbetter less than her male counterparts for more than 15 years, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Week after week, year after year, she was paid less. Significantly less. And this disparity was because of her sex. The jury also found Goodyear’s conduct to be bad enough to warrant an award of compensatory and punitive damages totaling $3 million.
On its face, it looked like Ms. Ledbetter had won. That she had finally received compensation for the years of discrimination, including the impact on her pension and retirement benefits. But that was before the Title VII damages cap and the Supreme Court intervened.
After the jury awarded Ms. Ledbetter her $3 million, the court was required by law to reduce her award to $300,000. Why? In 1991, Congress set damages caps in Title VII, which apply to gender, age and disability claims only, at $300,000. That amounts to ten percent of what the jury believed Ms. Ledbetter should receive, and a drop in the bucket to a corporation like Goodyear.
Two weeks ago, the second shoe dropped. The Supreme Court issued an opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber1 which prevented Ms. Ledbetter from recovering anything to remedy the discrimination that she endured. According to the Court’s new rule, Ms. Ledbetter filed her discrimination complaint too late. A 5-4 Court held that Title VII’s requirement that employees file their complaints within 180 days of “the alleged unlawful employment practice,”2 means that the complaint must be filed within 180 days from the day Goodyear first started to pay Ms. Ledbetter differently, rather than – as many courts had previously held -- from the day she received her last discriminatory paycheck.
The Court’s ruling on the statute of limitations in Ledbetter is fundamentally unfair to victims of pay discrimination. First, by immunizing employers from accountability for their discrimination once 180 days have passed from the initial pay decision, the Supreme Court has taken away victims’ recourse against continuing discrimination.
Moreover, the Court’s decision in Ledbetter ignores the realities of the workplace. Employees typically don’t know much about what their co-workers earn, or how pay decisions are made, making it difficult to satisfy the Court’s new rule.
As Justice Ginsberg pointedly emphasized in her dissent, pay discrimination is a hidden discrimination that is particularly dangerous due to the silence surrounding salary information in the United States. It is common practice for many employers to withhold comparative pay information from employees. One-third of private sector employers have adopted specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing their wages with co-workers, and a significant number of other employers have more informal expectations that employees do not discuss their salaries. Only one in ten employers has adopted a pay openness policy.3
Workers know immediately when they are fired, refused employment, or denied a promotion or transfer, but norms of secrecy and confidentiality prevent employees from obtaining compensation information. As Justice Ginsberg’s dissent points out, it is not unusual for businesses to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their own salaries.
The reality is that every time an employee receives a paycheck that is lessened by discrimination, it is an act of discrimination by the employer. The harm is ongoing; the remedy should be too.
In addition, the impact of the Title VII caps on Ms. Ledbetter clearly illustrates the need to eliminate this arbitrary provision from the law.
Under current law, individuals who prove that they have been the victims of intentional discrimination based on sex, disability or religion are only able to recover compensatory and punitive damages up to a cap of $300,000. This is true no matter how egregious the conduct of the discriminator, nor how long the discrimination continued. The caps create an artificial ceiling on damages awards that does not exist for individuals whose discrimination was based on race or national origin. If a person who was discriminated against on the basis of sex suffers the same adverse employment consequences as a person discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, why should one be eligible to receive more damages than another?
Moreover, often it is the most severe cases of discrimination that are affected by the damages caps. Damages caps, effectively, protect the worst offenders while denying relief to those who were harmed the most.
Caps also minimize the deterrent effect of Title VII. If the potential liability for sex discrimination is capped, it is manageable for corporations. More like a cost of doing business. However, uncapped damages, at a minimum, create more of an incentive for employers to ensure that their workplaces are free from discrimination. Compensatory damages are designed to make the victim whole. If the economic harms suffered by the victim of discrimination are greater than the statutory cap, it should not be the discrimination victim who is left with less.
Finally, in employment discrimination cases based on race or national origin – where there are no damages caps -- we have not seen runaway verdicts. This is, in part, due to the numerous existing limitations in the current law that guard against improperly high verdicts. Courts can use their remitter power to reduce or vacate excessive damage awards, and there are constitutional limitations on punitive damages.4
The impact of the Court’s decision in Ledbetter will be widespread, affecting pay discrimination cases under Title VII affecting women and racial and ethnic minorities, as well as cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act5 involving discrimination based on age and under the Americans with Disabilities Act6 involving discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
Here is an example. Imagine you have worked for a company for 30 years. You are a good worker. You do a good job. Unknown to you, the company puts workers who are 50 or older on a different salary track; lower than the younger workers who do the same work. At 60, you learn that for the last 10 years, you have been earning less – tens of thousands of dollars less than colleagues doing comparable work.
How do you feel?
Imagine you are this worker. How do you feel?
Even more, how do you feel when you learn that 180 days after you turned 50 – six months after you started getting paid less – you also lost your right to redress for the hundreds of discriminatory paychecks.
The decision in Ledbetter will have a broad real world impact. The following are just two examples of recent pay discrimination cases that would have come out very differently if the Court’s new rule had been in effect.
In Reese v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc.7 the plaintiff, an African-American man, never received the raise he was promised after six months of work. He did not realize his raise had never been awarded until three and a half years later, when he requested a copy of his payroll records for an unrelated investigation.8 The employee filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC, and the court initially granted summary judgment to the employer. On appeal, the employee argued that his claim was timely under the continuing violation theory, and the court concluded that the relevant precedents compelled the conclusion that each paycheck constituted a fresh act of discrimination, and thus his suit was timely.9 If the rule in Ledbetter had been in effect, the plaintiff would not have been able to seek relief.
In Goodwin v. General Motors Corp.10, an African-American woman was promoted to a labor representative position, with a salary that was between $300 and $500 less than other similarly-situated white employees.11 Over time, Goodwin’s salary disparity grew larger until she was being paid $547 less per month than the next lowest paid representative, while at the same time pay disparities among the other three labor representatives shrank from over $200 per month to only $82.12 Due to GM’s confidentiality policy, Goodwin did not discover the disparity until a printout of the 1997 salaries “somehow appeared on Goodwin’s desk.”13 She then brought a race discrimination action against her employer under Title VII. The district court dismissed the action, but the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that discriminatory salary payments constituted fresh violations of Title VII, and each action of pay-based discrimination was independent for purposes of statutory time limitations. Again, if the rule in Ledbetter had been in effect, the plaintiff would not have been able to obtain relief.
Pay discrimination is a type of hidden discrimination that continues to be an important issue in the United States. In the fiscal year 2006, individuals filed over 800 charges of unlawful, sex-based pay discrimination with the EEOC. Unfortunately, under the Ledbetter rationale, many meritorious claims will never be adjudicated.
While today we are focused on the immediate problem of the Ledbetter decision, it is also important to understand that this decision is part of the Court’s recent pattern of limiting both access to the courts and remedies available to victims of discrimination. The Court’s decisions have weakened the basic protections in ways that Congress never intended by Congress.
Under the Supreme Court’s recent rulings, older workers can no longer recover money damages for employment discrimination based on age if they are employed by the state14, state workers can no longer recover money damages if their employers violate minimum wage and overtime laws15; there is no private right of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196416; and workers can now be required to give up their right to sue in court for discrimination as a condition of employment.17 In many of these cases, as in Ledbetter, the Court is acting as a legislature, making its own policy while acting directly contrary to Congress’s intent.
For opponents of civil rights, there is no need to repeal Title VII. Instead you can substantially weaken its protections by chipping away at bedrock interpretations. Or, you can instead make it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to bring and win employment discrimination cases. Or if you make the remedies meaningless.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, Congress has stepped in on other occasions to correct the Court’s “cramped” interpretation of Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned several Supreme Court decisions that eroded the power of Title VII, including Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio18, which made it more difficult for employees to prove that an employer's personnel practices, neutral on their face, had an unlawful disparate impact on them, and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins19, which held that once an employee had proved that an unlawful consideration had played a part in the employer's personnel decision, the burden shifted to the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision if it had not been motivated by that unlawful factor, but that such proof by the employer would constitute a complete defense. As Justice Ginsburg sees it, “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court.”
We agree.
We also reiterate the need to end the disparity in employment discrimination law by removing the damages caps that apply to women, individuals with disabilities and older Americans under current law. The caps undercut enforcement, are unnecessary, and reward the most egregious discriminators with a substantial limitation on liability for their intentional discriminatory acts.
The issues in this case are not academic. The fallout will have a real impact on the lives of people across America.
People like Lily Ledbetter.
Members of the Committee, today you begin the process of responding to Justice Ginsburg’s call. A process that will reaffirm that civil rights have legally enforceable remedies.
Thank you.
1 Slip op. No. 05-1074 (U.S. Supreme Court)
2 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.
3 Bierman & Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 167, 168, 171 (2004).
4 BMW of Northern America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
5 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.
6 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
7 347 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2003)
8 Id. at 1007
9 Id. at 1013
10 275 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2002)
11 Id. at 1008
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1008
14 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
15 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
16 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)
17 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)
18 490 U.S. 642 (1989)19 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
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YouTube: Mayor Mike Bloomberg says that New York Observer reporter Azi Paybarah is "a disgrace".Mayor Bloomberg calls reporter 'a disgrace' for questioning rationale for third term runBy Celeste Katz, DAILY NEWS CITY HALL BUREAU, Thursday, May 28th 2009, 5:58 PM
LINKAsk Mayor Bloomberg about job creation statistics and you're fine.
Ask him about that pesky term limits thing and apparently, "you're a disgrace."
Bloomberg - who controversially got the City Council to lift the two-term limit so he could try for a third this year - went off on a reporter Thursday who questioned his rationale for running again.
At a Queens news conference to announce $31.7 million in job training funds, Bloomberg said there has been a change in the economic "psychology" of the city.
He mentioned improvements in the real estate market and a renewed willingness on the part of citygoers to spend at stores and restaurants.
At one point he said although the city still faces grave problems, "I'm reasonably optimistic that we've turned the corner."
But the mayor seemed downright provoked when a reporter asked if such improvements eliminated the need for a third Bloomberg term.
He had justified his desire for a third term, in part, by saying the city needed his management expertise in rough economic times.
"Why don't you just get serious questions here?" he interrupted
New York Observer reporter Azi Paybarah.
"The rationale for extending term limits is the City Council voted it and the public's going to have a chance on Nov. 3 to say what they want," the mayor said, interrupting again.
"I don't think we have to keep coming back to that... If you have a serious question about the economy, I will be happy to answer it."
After asking if there were any further questions - there were none - Bloomberg thanked the attendees, closed the news conference, glared at
Paybarah and said, quietly, "You're a disgrace."
Paybarah referred questions about the mayor's putdown to Observer Political Editor Josh Benson.
"It was a reasonable question," Benson said.
"We're comfortable leaving it to everyone else to judge the quality of the response."
ckatz@nydailynews.com
You're A Disgrace' (Updated)May 28, 2009
LINKTo the annals of Mayor Bloomberg's mistreatment of the press add his testy exchange today with The Observer's Azi Paybarah, who dared to ask Hizzoner a question about term limits.
The mayor, having just finished explaining to the DN's Celeste Katz that he happens to be "very optimistic" about the city's economy and giving anecdotal examples of how things are turning around, did not take kindly to Azi's inquiry about how this might undercut Bloomberg's own rationale for extending term limits - not to mention running for re-election.
Here's the transcript:
Azi: "If the economy is turning around as you said, does that mean that the rationale for extending term limits, which is the fiscal challenge...
Bloomberg: "I don't know. Why don't you just get to serious questions here and we'll just..."
Azi: No, but the question is...
Bloomberg: "The rationale for extending term limits is the City Council voted it, and the public's going to have a chance on Nov. 3 to say what they want, and I don't think we have to keep coming back to that. When you have a serious question about the economy i'd be happy to answer it."
"Anything else? Thank you very much. Nothing else? Great. Thank you."
(Applause).
And then, as the mayor walks away from the podium, he looks at Azi and says, almost under his breath: "You're a disgrace." (Read his lips).
Ironically, Bloomberg once used that very word to describe...the City Council's effort to change term limits.
Actually, he said that was an "absolute disgrace." But why quibble?
Bloomberg, who happens to be a media mogul, has a long history of tense interactions with reporters. His most recent dust-up was with blogger Michael Harris, who uses a wheelchair, during Gov. David Paterson's gay marriage press conference.
There was also his rather infamous exchange with Newsday's Michael Frazier over the word "maintain," which took place almost exactly a year ago.
UPDATE: Azi referred questions to his boss, Political Editor Josh Benson, who said (via e-mail): "It was a reasonable question. We're comfortable leaving it to everyone else to judge the quality of the response."
UPDATE2: Bloomberg spokesman Stu Loeser e-mailed Katz to say: "The Mayor asked me to pass along his apologies to Azi for the comment after the press conference, which I did."
Meanwhile, Comptroller Bill Thompson's campaign manager, Anne Fenton, commented:
"What’s disgraceful is the Mayor’s refusal to answer the tough questions. Calling people names, having staff block cameras and bullying the press aren’t going to stop people from asking the mayor to explain his term limits bait and switch.”
8 Comments
Field Marshal Tania
May 28, 2009
5:37 PM
Why does nobody seem to recognize what a hideous troll Bloomberg is?
NYRBLUE74
May 28, 2009
6:05 PM
Wow! Liz, you and celeste, don't miss much.Nice work.The Mayor, looked, like, he was ready to turn over a table.The leader of the greatest city in the world needs to be cool and steady.But, that moment! Scary!..
" Not cool" there.
Buckadelic
May 28, 2009
6:12 PM
[Why does nobody seem to recognize what a hideous troll Bloomberg is?]
Maybe you have to be a hideous troll to be mayor of New York City?
Learning the Political Game
May 28, 2009
7:11 PM
Azi is my new hero......Great question. His last comment before walking off........priceless!!!!
topo gigio
May 28, 2009
7:42 PM
Emperor Bloomberg doesn't like to have his motives questioned.
Keep up the good work, Azi.
We know who the real disgrace is here. It's the dude who is buying himself a third term and all the pols who were so easily bought off.
ROSALIE907
May 28, 2009
10:05 PM
Good job Azi and keep it up. By the way, why couldn't Bloomberg call Azi himself to apologize or is it beneath him to tell a reporter that he, Mike Bloomberg, is a jerk.
REMEMBER TERM LIMITS ON NOV 3, 2009.
Don'tHateMeLoveMe
May 28, 2009
11:07 PM
Lizzie, looking out for Azi, yeah. If Bloomberg spoke that way to Lizzie then I would have punch him in his mouth.
jpyanks
May 28, 2009
11:12 PM
It seems that most of us posting notes dislike Napoleon Bloomberg. Besides voting for Bill Thompson, please talk to your friends and family in NYC to vote against him. This is the only way we're going to get rid of this egomaniac and save our city. Thompson is the City Comptroller and obviously knows how to handle a billion dollar budget and talk to the citizens of the city he grew up in politely and with dignity. VOTE BLOOMBERG OUT!!!
Read more: "The Daily Politics - NY Daily News" - http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2009/05/youre-a-disgrace.html#ixzz0GrhcfX0V&A
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Do you feel that your employer is discriminating against you or others on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, family commitments, and/or disparate treatment? Then you should start reading up on the Federal Laws that may cover you, once you exhaust all your administrative remedies - i.e. you have tried all channels within your workplace to reach a solution to your alleged discrimination. (I am not an attorney and cannot give legal advice, so if you are in doubt about how these laws affect you, call an attorney).
Betsy Combier
Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination:
Questions And AnswersEEOCFederal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) LawsI. What Are the Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination? *
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
* the
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), which protects men and women who perform substantially equal work in the same establishment from sex-based wage discrimination;
* the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which protects individuals who are 40 years of age or older;
* Title I and Title V of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibit employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in the private sector, and in state and local governments;
* Sections 501 and 505 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities who work in the federal government; and
* the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which, among other things, provides monetary damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination.
EEOC Outreach Audiences For Education and Technical AssistanceThe
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces all of these laws. EEOC also provides oversight and coordination of all federal equal employment opportunity regulations, practices, and policies.
Other federal laws, not enforced by EEOC, also prohibit discrimination and reprisal against federal employees and applicants. The
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) contains a number of prohibitions, known as prohibited personnel practices, which are designed to promote overall fairness in
federal personnel actions. 5 U.S.C. 2302. [See also
Whistleblower Retaliation - Editor] The CSRA
prohibits any employee who has authority to take certain personnel actions from discriminating for or against employees or applicants for employment on the bases of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age or disability. It also provides that certain personnel actions can not be based on attributes or conduct that do not adversely affect employee performance, such as marital status and political affiliation. The
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has interpreted the prohibition of discrimination based on conduct to include discrimination based on sexual orientation. The CSRA also prohibits reprisal against federal employees or applicants for whistle-blowing, or for exercising an appeal, complaint, or grievance right. The CSRA is enforced by both the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
Additional information about the enforcement of the CSRA:
the OPM web site at
http://www.opm.gov/er/address2/guide01.htm; from OSC at (202) 653-7188 or at
http://www.osc.gov; and from MSPB at (202) 653-6772 or at
http://www.mspb.gov .
Discriminatory PracticesFormsII. What Discriminatory Practices Are Prohibited by These Laws?Under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, it is illegal to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including:
* hiring and firing;
* compensation, assignment, or classification of employees;
* transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall;
* job advertisements;
* recruitment;
* testing;
* use of company facilities;
* training and apprenticeship programs;
* fringe benefits;
* pay, retirement plans, and disability leave; or
* other terms and conditions of employment.
Discriminatory practices under these laws also include:
* harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or age;
* retaliation against an individual for filing a charge of discrimination, participating in an investigation, or opposing discriminatory practices;
* employment decisions based on stereotypes or assumptions about the abilities, traits, or performance of individuals of a certain sex, race, age, religion, or ethnic group, or individuals with disabilities; and
* denying employment opportunities to a person because of marriage to, or association with, an individual of a particular race, religion, national origin, or an individual with a disability. Title VII also prohibits discrimination because of participation in schools or places of worship associated with a particular racial, ethnic, or religious group.
Employers are required to post notices to all employees advising them of their rights under the laws EEOC enforces and their right to be free from retaliation. Such notices must be accessible, as needed, to persons with visual or other disabilities that affect reading.
Note: Many states and municipalities also have enacted protections against discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation, status as a parent, marital status and political affiliation. For information, please contact the EEOC District Office nearest you.
III. What Other Practices Are Discriminatory Under These Laws?Title VIITitle VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.
National Origin Discrimination
* It is illegal to discriminate against an individual because of birthplace, ancestry, culture, or linguistic characteristics common to a specific ethnic group.
* A rule requiring that employees speak only English on the job may violate Title VII unless an employer shows that the requirement is necessary for conducting business. If the employer believes such a rule is necessary, employees must be informed when English is required and the consequences for violating the rule.
The
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 requires employers to assure that employees hired are legally authorized to work in the U.S. However, an employer who requests employment verification only for individuals of a particular national origin, or individuals who appear to be or sound foreign, may violate both Title VII and IRCA; verification must be obtained from all applicants and employees. Employers who impose citizenship requirements or give preferences to U.S. citizens in hiring or employment opportunities also may violate IRCA.
Additional information about IRCA may be obtained from the
Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices at 1-800-255-7688 (voice), 1-800-237-2515 (TTY for employees/applicants) or 1-800-362-2735 (TTY for employers) or at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/osc.
Religious Accommodation * An employer is required to reasonably accommodate the religious belief of an employee or prospective employee, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.
Sex DiscriminationTitle VII's broad prohibitions against sex discrimination specifically cover:
* Sexual Harassment - This includes practices ranging from direct requests for sexual favors to workplace conditions that create a hostile environment for persons of either gender, including same sex harassment. (The "hostile environment" standard also applies to harassment on the bases of race, color, national origin, religion, age, and disability.)
* Pregnancy Based Discrimination - Pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions must be treated in the same way as other temporary illnesses or conditions.
Additional rights are available to parents and others under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor. For information on the FMLA, or to file an FMLA complaint, individuals should contact the nearest office of the
Wage and Hour Division, Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. The Wage and Hour Division is listed in most telephone directories under U.S. Government, Department of Labor or at http://www.dol.gov/esa/public/whd_org.htm.
Age Discrimination in Employment ActThe ADEA's broad ban against age discrimination also specifically prohibits:
* statements or specifications in job notices or advertisements of age preference and limitations. An age limit may only be specified in the rare circumstance where age has been proven to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ);
* discrimination on the basis of age by apprenticeship programs, including joint labor-management apprenticeship programs; and
* denial of benefits to older employees. An employer may reduce benefits based on age only if the cost of providing the reduced benefits to older workers is the same as the cost of providing benefits to younger workers.
Equal Pay ActThe EPA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in the payment of wages or benefits, where men and women perform work of similar skill, effort, and responsibility for the same employer under similar working conditions.
Note that:
* Employers may not reduce wages of either sex to equalize pay between men and women.
* A violation of the EPA may occur where a different wage was/is paid to a person who worked in the same job before or after an employee of the opposite sex.
* A violation may also occur where a labor union causes the employer to violate the law.
Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities ActThe ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in all employment practices. It is necessary to understand several important ADA definitions to know who is protected by the law and what constitutes illegal discrimination:
Individual with a Disability An individual with a disability under the ADA is a person who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. Major life activities are activities that an average person can perform with little or no difficulty such as walking, breathing, seeing, hearing, speaking, learning, and working.
Qualified Individual with a Disability A qualified employee or applicant with a disability is someone who satisfies skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the position held or desired, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of that position.
Reasonable Accommodation Reasonable accommodation may include, but is not limited to, making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities; job restructuring; modification of work schedules; providing additional unpaid leave; reassignment to a vacant position; acquiring or modifying equipment or devices; adjusting or modifying examinations, training materials, or policies; and providing qualified readers or interpreters. Reasonable accommodation may be necessary to apply for a job, to perform job functions, or to enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment that are enjoyed by people without disabilities. An employer is not required to lower production standards to make an accommodation. An employer generally is not obligated to provide personal use items such as eyeglasses or hearing aids.
Undue Hardship An employer is required to make a reasonable accommodation to a qualified individual with a disability unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business. Undue hardship means an action that requires significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation to factors such as a business' size, financial resources, and the nature and structure of its operation.
Prohibited Inquiries and Examinations Before making an offer of employment, an employer may not ask job applicants about the existence, nature, or severity of a disability. Applicants may be asked about their ability to perform job functions. A job offer may be conditioned on the results of a medical examination, but only if the examination is required for all entering employees in the same job category. Medical examinations of employees must be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
Drug and Alcohol Use Employees and applicants currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs are not protected by the ADA when an employer acts on the basis of such use. Tests for illegal use of drugs are not considered medical examinations and, therefore, are not subject to the ADA's restrictions on medical examinations. Employers may hold individuals who are illegally using drugs and individuals with alcoholism to the same standards of performance as other employees.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made major changes in the federal laws against employment discrimination enforced by EEOC. Enacted in part to reverse several Supreme Court decisions that limited the rights of persons protected by these laws, the Act also provides additional protections. The Act authorizes compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination, and provides for obtaining attorneys' fees and the possibility of jury trials. It also directs the EEOC to expand its technical assistance and outreach activities.
Employers And Other Entities Covered By EEO Laws
IV. Which Employers and Other Entities Are Covered by These Laws?Title VII and the ADA cover all private employers, state and local governments, and education institutions that employ 15 or more individuals. These laws also cover private and public employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor management committees controlling apprenticeship and training.
The ADEA covers all private employers with 20 or more employees, state and local governments (including school districts), employment agencies and labor organizations.
The EPA covers all employers who are covered by the Federal Wage and Hour Law (the Fair Labor Standards Act). Virtually all employers are subject to the provisions of this Act.
Title VII, the ADEA, and the EPA also cover the federal government. In addition, the federal government is covered by Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, which incorporate the requirements of the ADA. However, different procedures are used for processing complaints of federal discrimination. For more information on how to file a complaint of federal discrimination, contact the EEO office of the federal agency where the alleged discrimination occurred.
The CSRA (not enforced by EEOC) covers most federal agency employees except employees of a government corporation, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit thereof, the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, or the General Accounting Office.
The EEOC'S Charge Processing ProceduresFederal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing.
V. Who Can File a Charge of Discrimination? * Any individual who believes that his or her employment rights have been violated may file a charge of discrimination with EEOC.
* In addition, an individual, organization, or agency may file a charge on behalf of another person in order to protect the aggrieved person's identity.
VI. How Is a Charge of Discrimination Filed? * A charge may be filed by mail or in person at the nearest EEOC office. Individuals may consult their local telephone directory (U.S. Government listing) or call 1-800-669-4000 (voice) or 1-800-669-6820 (TTY) to contact the nearest EEOC office for more information on specific procedures for filing a charge.
* Individuals who need an accommodation in order to file a charge (e.g., sign language interpreter, print materials in an accessible format) should inform the EEOC field office so appropriate arrangements can be made.
* Federal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing. See
Performance AuditVII. What Information Must Be Provided to File a Charge? * The complaining party's name, address, and telephone number;
* The name, address, and telephone number of the respondent employer, employment agency, or union that is alleged to have discriminated, and number of employees (or union members), if known;
* A short description of the alleged violation (the event that caused the complaining party to believe that his or her rights were violated); and
* The date(s) of the alleged violation(s).
* Federal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing.
VIII. What Are the Time Limits for Filing a Charge of Discrimination?All laws enforced by EEOC, except the Equal Pay Act, require filing a charge with EEOC before a private lawsuit may be filed in court. There are strict time limits within which charges must be filed:
* A charge must be filed with EEOC within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation, in order to protect the charging party's rights.
* This 180-day filing deadline is extended to 300 days if the charge also is covered by a state or local anti-discrimination law. For ADEA charges, only state laws extend the filing limit to 300 days.
* These time limits do not apply to claims under the Equal Pay Act, because under that Act persons do not have to first file a charge with EEOC in order to have the right to go to court. However, since many EPA claims also raise Title VII sex discrimination issues, it may be advisable to file charges under both laws within the time limits indicated.
* To protect legal rights, it is always best to contact EEOC promptly when discrimination is suspected.
* Federal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing.
IX. What Agency Handles a Charge that is also Covered by State or Local Law?Many states and localities have anti-discrimination laws and agencies responsible for enforcing those laws. EEOC refers to these agencies as "Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs)." Through the use of "work sharing agreements," EEOC and the FEPAs avoid duplication of effort while at the same time ensuring that a charging party's rights are protected under both federal and state law.
* If a charge is filed with a FEPA and is also covered by federal law, the FEPA "dual files" the charge with EEOC to protect federal rights. The charge usually will be retained by the FEPA for handling.
* If a charge is filed with EEOC and also is covered by state or local law, EEOC "dual files" the charge with the state or local FEPA, but ordinarily retains the charge for handling.
X. What Happens after a Charge is Filed with EEOC?The employer is notified that the charge has been filed. From this point there are a number of ways a charge may be handled:
* A charge may be assigned for priority investigation if the initial facts appear to support a violation of law. When the evidence is less strong, the charge may be assigned for follow up investigation to determine whether it is likely that a violation has occurred.
* EEOC can seek to settle a charge at any stage of the investigation if the charging party and the employer express an interest in doing so. If settlement efforts are not successful, the investigation continues.
* In investigating a charge, EEOC may make written requests for information, interview people, review documents, and, as needed, visit the facility where the alleged discrimination occurred. When the investigation is complete, EEOC will discuss the evidence with the charging party or employer, as appropriate.
* The charge may be selected for EEOC's mediation program if both the charging party and the employer express an interest in this option. Mediation is offered as an alternative to a lengthy investigation. Participation in the mediation program is confidential, voluntary, and requires consent from both charging party and employer. If mediation is unsuccessful, the charge is returned for investigation.
* A charge may be dismissed at any point if, in the agency's best judgment, further investigation will not establish a violation of the law. A charge may be dismissed at the time it is filed, if an initial in-depth interview does not produce evidence to support the claim. When a charge is dismissed, a notice is issued in accordance with the law which gives the charging party 90 days in which to file a lawsuit on his or her own behalf.
* Federal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing.
XI. How Does EEOC Resolve Discrimination Charges? * If the evidence obtained in an investigation does not establish that discrimination occurred, this will be explained to the charging party. A required notice is then issued, closing the case and giving the charging party 90 days in which to file a lawsuit on his or her own behalf.
* If the evidence establishes that discrimination has occurred, the employer and the charging party will be informed of this in a letter of determination that explains the finding. EEOC will then attempt conciliation with the employer to develop a remedy for the discrimination.
* If the case is successfully conciliated, or if a case has earlier been successfully mediated or settled, neither EEOC nor the charging party may go to court unless the conciliation, mediation, or settlement agreement is not honored.
* If EEOC is unable to successfully conciliate the case, the agency will decide whether to bring suit in federal court. If EEOC decides not to sue, it will issue a notice closing the case and giving the charging party 90 days in which to file a lawsuit on his or her own behalf. In Title VII and ADA cases against state or local governments, the Department of Justice takes these actions.
* Federal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing.
XII. When Can an Individual File an Employment Discrimination Lawsuit in Court?A charging party may file a lawsuit within 90 days after receiving a notice of a "right to sue" from EEOC, as stated above. Under Title VII and the ADA, a charging party also can request a notice of "right to sue" from EEOC 180 days after the charge was first filed with the Commission, and may then bring suit within 90 days after receiving this notice. Under the ADEA, a suit may be filed at any time 60 days after filing a charge with EEOC, but not later than 90 days after EEOC gives notice that it has completed action on the charge.
Under the EPA, a lawsuit must be filed within two years (three years for willful violations) of the discriminatory act, which in most cases is payment of a discriminatory lower wage.
Federal employees or applicants for employment should see the fact sheet about Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Processing.
XIII. What Remedies Are Available When Discrimination Is Found?The "relief" or remedies available for employment discrimination, whether caused by intentional acts or by practices that have a discriminatory effect, may include:
* back pay,
* hiring,
* promotion,
* reinstatement,
* front pay,
* reasonable accommodation, or
* other actions that will make an individual "whole" (in the condition s/he would have been but for the discrimination).
Remedies also may include payment of:
* attorneys' fees,
* expert witness fees, and
* court costs.
Under most EEOC-enforced laws, compensatory and punitive damages also may be available where intentional discrimination is found. Damages may be available to compensate for actual monetary losses, for future monetary losses, and for mental anguish and inconvenience. Punitive damages also may be available if an employer acted with malice or reckless indifference. Punitive damages are not available against the federal, state or local governments.
In cases concerning reasonable accommodation under the ADA, compensatory or punitive damages may not be awarded to the charging party if an employer can demonstrate that "good faith" efforts were made to provide reasonable accommodation.
An employer may be required to post notices to all employees addressing the violations of a specific charge and advising them of their rights under the laws EEOC enforces and their right to be free from retaliation. Such notices must be accessible, as needed, to persons with visual or other disabilities that affect reading.
The employer also may be required to take corrective or preventive actions to cure the source of the identified discrimination and minimize the chance of its recurrence, as well as discontinue the specific discriminatory practices involved in the case.
The CommissionXIV. What Is EEOC and How Does It Operate?EEOC is an independent federal agency originally created by Congress in 1964 to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission is composed of five Commissioners and a General Counsel appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Commissioners are appointed for five-year staggered terms; the General Counsel's term is four years. The President designates a Chair and a Vice-Chair. The Chair is the chief executive officer of the Commission. The Commission has authority to establish equal employment policy and to approve litigation. The General Counsel is responsible for conducting litigation.
EEOC carries out its enforcement, education and technical assistance activities through 50 field offices serving every part of the nation.
The nearest EEOC field office may be contacted by calling: 1-800-669-4000 (voice) or 1-800-669-6820 (TTY).
Information And Assistance Available From EEOC
XV. What Information and Other Assistance Is Available from EEOC?EEOC provides a range of informational materials and assistance to individuals and entities with rights and responsibilities under EEOC-enforced laws. Most materials and assistance are provided to the public at no cost. Additional specialized training and technical assistance are provided on a fee basis under the auspices of the EEOC Education, Technical Assistance, and
Training Revolving Fund Act of 1992. For information on educational and other assistance available, contact the nearest EEOC office by calling: 1-800-669-4000 (voice) or 1-800-669-6820 (TTY).
Publications available at no cost include posters advising employees of their EEO rights, and pamphlets, manuals, fact sheets, and enforcement guidance on laws enforced by the Commission. For a list of EEOC publications, or to order publications, write, call, or fax:
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Publications Distribution Center
P.O. Box 12549
Cincinnati, Ohio 45212-0549
1-800-669-3362 (voice)
1-800-800-3302 (TTY)
513-489-8692 (fax)
Telephone operators are available to take orders (in English or Spanish) from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday. Orders generally are mailed within 48 hours after receipt.
This pamphlet is available in braille, large print, audiotape, and electronic file on computer disk. Other EEOC publications are available in accessible formats on request. Requests to obtain accessible formats should be directed to the Publications Distribution Center.
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